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Case No. 20090767 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
John M. McHugh, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for making a terroristic threat, a second 
degree felony, in Fourth District Court, Wasatch County, the Honorable Gary D. 
Stott presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion 
for mistrial based on a claim that the prosecutor withheld allegedly exculpatory 
phone recordings, where nothing in the record shows that such recordings exist? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
mistrial, an appellate court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Allen, 2005 UT11, | 39,108 P.3d 730. 
2. Had Defendant's met his burden to demonstrate that his trial counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient and was Defendant prejudiced by his 
counsel's failure to obtain allegedly exculpatory phone recordings where nothing in 
the record reveals their content or even whether they exist? 
Standard of Review: "' An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law,' which we review for correctness." 
State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317,f10,169 P.3d 806 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
t 6, 89 P.3d 162). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to the issues raised in 
this. In pertinent part, Rule 16 states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or 
codefendants;... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 2, 2008, Defendant was charged by Information with making a 
terroristic threat, a second degree felony. R. 10-11. 
In an Affidavit in Support of Warrant of Arrest, Sargent Jason Bradley of the 
Heber City Police Department stated that a bomb threat called into the Wasatch 
County School District Office was traced to Defendant's cell phone. R. 5-8. 
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Following a preliminary hearing on November 24, 2008, Defendant was 
bound over for trial. R. 73. 
Defendant was convicted as charged following a two-day jury trial on June 
23-24, 2009. R. 147,203,204. 
On August 13,2009, Defendant was sentenced to one to 15 years at the Utah 
State Prison. R. 152. The sentence was suspended and defendant was sentenced to 
180 days in jail, a $1143 fine and 36 months of probation. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 159. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant has never denied that he was "responsible" for the phone used to 
make a bomb threat. R. 203:124,209. Indeed, telephone records clearly show that the 
call came from his phone. Nor has he denied that he admitted to his girlfriend and 
her daughter that he made the bomb threat so that the daughter could get out of 
school. Nor has he proposed a plausible scenario in which someone else used his 
phone to call in the bomb threat. 
The bomb threat 
Lori Magnusson, a secretary at the Wasatch School District in Heber City, 
knew it was getting close to lunchtime because she was starting to get hungry. 
R.203:104. Around noon on March 26,2008, or a little after, she received a phone 
call that likely ruined her appetite: 
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"The bomb will go off at 2:00," came a monotone male voice from the 
receiver. Id. 
"[Ejxcuse me[?]" Magnusson said. Id. 
But the phone was dead. Id. 
Magnusson was overwhelmed. "The first thing I did was bury my hands in 
my head [sic] and kind of tried to re-compose myself." R.203:105. She figured the 
call was probably a prank, but she knew she couldn't take that chance. Id. She 
immediately reported the bomb threat to her supervisor. R.203:106. 
Because the location of the alleged bomb was not disclosed, law enforcement 
and school officials decided to evacuate all eight schools within the district. 
R.203:112. A total of 4,218 children and 577 staff members were evacuated. 
R.203:113. 
Sixty-seven law enforcement personnel from seven different jurisdictions 
spent several hours searching the schools. R.203:115-16. No bomb was found. 
R.203:122. 
The investigation 
Although the number of the telephone used to make the bomb threat was 
blocked, R. 203:128, investigators soon determined it came from Defendant's cell 
phone. By subpoenaing all phone calls made to the school office over a 24-hour 
period, investigators found the number that corresponded to the time the bomb 
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threat was made. R. 203:128-29. Further research disclosed that the number was 
that of a Louisiana Nextel phone belonging to John McHugh, the Defendant. R. 
203:130. By calling the numbers dialed from Defendant's phone before and after the 
bomb threat, investigators determined that Defendant had been using the phone at 
the time. R. 203:132. 
Jeremy Hales, Wasatch County Sheriffs Deputy and resource officer for the 
school district, stated that when confronted about the bomb threat, Defendant stated 
that "he did not make the call but was responsible for his phone/' R.203:124, 209. 
Defense counsel elicited, through cross-examination, an acknowledgement 
that there are several ways to block caller ID or even to make a number other than 
that belonging to the originating phone appear on caller ID through what is known 
as a "spoof" card. R.203:138-42. Moreover, the cell phone's internal log did not 
date back far enough to substantiate that the phone had been used to make the 
bomb threat. R.203:145. 
Defendant admits he made the bomb threat 
Tammy Baker, a former resident of Heber City, was dating the Defendant at 
the time of the bomb threat. R. 204:271. She informed police that Defendant had 
told her that he had made the bomb threat. R. 204:279-80. Baker said that, several 
days after the bomb threat, Defendant said to her, "I need to tell you a secret." Id. 
Defendant pulled Baker aside and said: "I did it, I'm the one who made that call." 
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Id. Baker said she called him "stupid" and asked why he would make such a call. 
R. 204:281. 
"He said he thought it would be funny or cool or cute or a nice joke or 
something to that effect and he did it to impress my daughter, to get her out of 
school is pretty much what he said and I don't remember the exact words." Id. 
Defendant also admitted the crime to Baker's daughter, Brandi, who 
testified: 
He said, You promise you won't tell anybody something if I tell you? 
A ~ J T ~~IA - ~ 0 T A~ ~„A U Q ers-A T ~>r>AQ 0 > Q U 11 T U<*A 
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called the school to get you out of school early and I said that there will 
be a bomb going off at 2:00. And I said, Well why would you do that? 
And he said because I wanted to get you out of school early. 
R. 204:246. Defendant also told Brandi that he had "star 67'd" his number so that it 
blocked the call. R. 204:246-47. Brandi reported Defendant's statements to police. 
Id. 
Defendant also made incriminating statements to Casey Mair, Brandi's 
boyfriend. R. 204:232-33. Mair said that on April 18,2008, Defendant offered him "a 
jeep and $1000 and stuff if I'd take the blame" for the bomb threat. R. 204:234. "He 
just asked me if I would take the blame he'd give me a new Jeep Wrangler, $1000 
and like a camping trailer and I just told him, no, I'm not going to do it." R. 204:235. 
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Mistrial motion 
Defendant claimed telephone conversations he had with Tammy Baker while 
he was incarcerated were taped by jail officials, that the taped conversations were 
exculpatory and that the State failed to produce them, despite Defendant's 
discovery request and a subpoena to the jail. See, e.g., R. 204:315. The trial court 
denied the motion, ruling that because Defendant did not follow up on his 
subpoena of jail records to determine whether the jail had produced the evidence 
requested, he cannot raise that issue at the conclusion of trial after both sides rested. 
"If the defendant wanted discovery, submit your discovery request. If you don't get 
the information you've asked for, file you[r] bill of particulars and I go over them 
and I'm one that 99 9/10 of the time will tell the State, provide what's been asked 
for . . . " R. 204:315. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant's claim that the State did not fulfill its disclosure 
requirements under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, fails for two reasons. First, Defendant has not properly 
marshaled the facts supporting the trial court's finding that there was no Brady or 
discovery violation. Second, even assuming Defendant met his marshaling burden, 
the claim fails on the merits because there is no evidence as to the content of 
recorded jail conversations or even whether such recordings exist. 
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Point II: Defendant has not demonstrated trial counsel was ineffective 
for not obtaining alleged recordings of jail telephone conversations between 
Defendant and Tammy Baker because he has failed to demonstrate that 




DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OR OTHERWISE MEET ITS 
DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS IS MERITLESS WHERE THE 
RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT SUCH EVIDENCE EXISTS. 
Due process requires that a prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to the 
defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 676 (1985). But "prosecutorial nondisclosure of information favorable to the 
accused does not by itself constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal of a 
conviction. . . . Rather, nondisclosure violates due process under Brady only if the 
evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if the defense did not become 
aware of the evidence until after trial." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, Tj 36, 37 P.3d 
1073. Evidence is material "if 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.'" Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, Tf 29,128 P.3d 1123 (quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433 (1995)). 
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Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where 
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial, 
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, 
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its 
advantage during trial[.] 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1 33. 
The merits of Defendant's Brady claim should not be considered because 
Defendant fails to comply with this Court's marshaling requirement. In any case, 
the claim because it is without record support. 
A. The Merits Should Not Be Considered, Because Defendant 
Fails To Marshal The Facts Supporting The Denial Of The 
New Trial Motion. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires Defendant to 
"marshal all record evidence that supports" a challenged finding or fact-dependent 
ruling. Proper marshaling requires Defendant to amass "every scrap of evidence 
and draw all reasonable inferences that support the adverse decision and then show 
why that evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, is 
legally insufficient. United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2006 UT 35, If 24,140 P.3d 1200; State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, If 20,186 
P.3d 1023. To accomplish this, Defendant must embrace the State's position: 
[Appellants] are required to "temporarily remove their own prejudices 
and fully embrace the adversary's position"; they must play the 
"devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must. . . not attempt to 
construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . [and must 
not] merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court. 
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United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 26 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). When an appellant fails to properly "perform this critical task, [the 
appellant court] can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of facts" 
and legal ruling. Id, at f 27. 
Here, Defendant fails to comply with rule 24's marshaling requirement. 
Indeed, he never acknowledges it. Consequently, his Brady claim should be 
summarily rejected. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 40; 114 P.3d 551. 
B. Even If Defendant Had Properly Marshaled the Evidence, His 
Defendant's Brady and discovery claim fails in any event because it is based 
on unsubstantiated conjecture that the jail recordings exist and that they would be 
exculpatory. Additionally, Defendant's waived the claim by failing to raise it until 
the conclusion of trial. 
A defendant seeking a new trial based on an alleg;ed Brady violation has the 
burden to demonstrate that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, either 
intentionally or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and 
(3) prejudice resulted. Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, f 28,128 R3d 1123, 533 (citing 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263) (1999)); United States v. Velarde, 485 F,3d 553, 558 
(10th Cir. 2007). 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides remedies for 
discovery violations. When a party fails to produce requested discovery, the trial 
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court may order the discovery, grant a continuance, prohibit introduction of the 
undisclosed evidence or "enter any other order it deems just under the 
circumstances." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g). 
Defendant's claim fails on appeal because there is no record to support that 
the recordings exist. Defendant's claim that his conversations with Baker were 
recorded is based entirely on the general statement from Deputy Hales, who 
testified that he had no personal knowledge of such tapes, but that "phone calls are 
all recorded that leave the jail/7 R. 204:305. Thus, defendant's Brady claim is based 
solely on "'speculation and conjecture' . . . concerning the alleged exculpatory 
nature of the evidence. That is not enough." United States v. Ashley, 274 Fed. Appx. 
693,697, 2008 WL1766868 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 
800, 804 (10th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 514 
(D.C. Cir.1996) (declining to infer the existence of Brady material based upon 
speculation alone, and therefore rejecting defendant's Brady claim because "[e]xcept 
for bare speculation, . . . [defendant] has nothing to suggest the existence of 
favorable materials"). 
What's more, the trial court correctly ruled that Defendant had waived any 
claim that the phone recordings had not been produced by not raising the issue until 
after both sides had rested. See R. 204:315. "[C]ourts universally refuse to overturn 
convictions where the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during 
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trial, where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, or where 
the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage during trial but 
failed to do so." State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 37, P.3d 1073; see United States v. 
Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding no Brady violation where 
defense could have obtained the information "with any reasonable diligence") 
(citation and internal punctuation omitted); see also State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 
883 (Utah 1988) ("defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)... by not making timely 
efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's conduct"). 
Because defense counsel knew that there might be recordings of jail conversations 
and did not follow up with a more specific discovery request, he cannot claim the 
State suppressed the evidence. 
In sum, because Defendant has not shown that the records exist, he cannot 
show that they were constitutionally material, i.e., that "'there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different/" Id. at f 29 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433). 




DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM FAILS 
BECAUSE THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT IT. 
Defendant alternatively alleges that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not timely obtaining the alleged telephone recordings. This claim also 
fails for lack of factual support. 
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must 
meet both prongs of the test first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, defendant must show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient—that is, counsel's performance did not meet 
an objective standard of reasonableness—by identifying counsel's specific acts or 
omissions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (1984). Defendant must also show that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; see also State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19,12 P.3d 92. 
However, this Court need not '"address both components of the inquiry if the 
[defendant] makes an insufficient showing on one.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
523 (Utah) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)), cert denied, 
513 U.S. 966 (1994). "When it is 'easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,' we will do so without addressing whether 
counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable." Id. 
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Here, Defendant cannot establish prejudice because his claim lacks record 
support. Defendant claims that: 
Given Tammy Baker's testimony included an alleged confession from 
the Defendant, her testimony was of paramount importance to the 
State's case. There is a very likely possibility the recorded conversations 
between John McHugh and Tammy Baker, while he was in jail, would 
include a statement by Ms. Baker that would have confirmed the 
Defendant's position. 
Aplt. Br. at 13-14 (emphasis added). 
Like Defendant's discovery claims, this claim lacks any record support. 
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counsel claim. "On appeal, it is the defendant's obligation to provide supporting 
arguments by citation to the record. 'If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76,111 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1226 (Utah 
1997) (additional citations and punctuation omitted). Where the record is 
inadequate to support a claim of ineffective assistance, Utah rules provide a 
mechanism for a remand to the trial court for development of the necessary facts. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 23B ("A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court 
to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
Under rule 23B, Defendant "bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for 
a temporary remand." Litlterland, 2000 UT 76, f^ 11. Defendant has not met his 
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burden. There is no evidence that the recordings existed, let alone what their 
substance was if they did exist. 
In short, it is sheer speculation for Defendant to claim that the tapes exist and 
that "they would have confirmed [his] position/7 Aplt. Br. at 14. Because the record 
does not support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November 22,2010. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
TJ. DELPORTO 7 ~Q BRET  J. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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